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Summary
Arrow's (and Kaldor's) representation of learning-by-doing and the current
state of technique as a function of capital rather than of cumulated output
—
the latter being the empirical basis for the learning-by-doing concept—leads to
major confusion. An obvious though not-very-important example is that a constant
production level implies no progress in such a formulation, though there is solid
evidence that learning-by-doing continues as cumulated output increases.
The most important implication of learning-by-doing for population policy
—
with respect to immigration as well as natural increase— is that a population of
larger size implies faster growth of consumption per head than does a smaller
population size. Arrow's formulation does not reveal this implication, and
empirical work built on Arrow's model does not reach this conclusion. The paper
unravels an apparent paradox and shows that a corrected formulation of the learning-
by-doing model does indeed have this important implication, which is consistent
with relevant empirical data of several kinds.
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THE IMPORTANT ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF LEARNING-BY-DOING
FOR POPULATION SIZE AND GROWTH*
Julian L. Simon
I. INTRODUCTION
Following on Che empirical studies of learning-by-doing by Wright
(1936), Asher (1956) and others, and the summary and interpretation by
Hirsch (1956) and Alchian (1963), Arrow combined the effect of experi-
ence with a macromodel to study the economic implications. This taodel
followed Kaldor in making technical progress endogenous, though Kaldor's
point of departure was Verdoorn's macro and industry data (19A9) , rather
than the firm-level data on which Arrow built and which lend themselves
more obviously to a learning interpretation than do Verdoorn's data.
This note contends that Arrow did not derive the most important
implications of learning-by-doing, and that he also reached some wrong
conclusions, because he modeled learning-by-doing poorly. These
conclusions— that population growth, and even more importantly, popu-
lation size, have positive effects upon the rate of economic growth
through their positive effects on the rate of technical progress—have
major implications for the understanding of, and social policy with
respect to, population size and growth.
Section II criticizes the concept of experience Arrow used, to
make clear the necessity for a fresh start. Section III shows the
implications for evaluation of different sizes of population, which
requires unraveling an apparent paradox in Arrow's (and Kaldor's)
*I appreciate helpful readings of this paper by Mark Browning and
Jonathan Cave.
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analyses which leads to incorrect conclusions about this matter. Section
IV shows the implications of learning-by-doing for evaluation of the
effects on consumption of different rates of population growth on size.
Section V summarizes the work and the conclusions.
II. CRITICISM OF ARROW'S MEASURE OF EXPERIENCE
This section is in the nature of clearing of debris.
All the empirical studies on which Arrow relied, and also most of
those that have come afterwards (with exceptions to be noted below) re-
lated something like "the amount of direct labor required to produce an
airframe and the [cumulative] number of airframes produced" (Alchian,
1963, p. 680)
.
(1) H^ = H^n"'^ = H^ - Hj_(1 - n"^)
where N = serial number of a particular unit of output
H = hours of work per unit of output for serial number N
b = constant.
Arrow is very clear on this: "The economic examples given above suggest
the possibility of using cumulative output (the total of output from the
beginning of time) as an index of experience" (p. 157)
.
But then, because Arrow doubted the psychological generalization
implicit in that measurement (which also avoids the necessity of coming
up with a number for cumulated output since the beginning of time) , he
shifted to a very different concept, with entirely different implications.
"I therefore take instead cimiulative gross investment [the capital stock]
(cumulative production of capital goods) as an index of experience"
(p. 157) . That is,
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(2)
^t = H~= ^^V = '^t '
where A = level of technique
K = capital stock
d = constant.
He also shifted from a serial-number concept to a time-period concept,
a difficult matter which will be taken up later.
Let us be clear on the possible confusions caused by taking the cap-
ital stock rather than cumulative gross output as the index of experience.
One such confusion is that, even using Arrow's own assumptions, cumulative
capital and cumulated output yield different conclusions, as may be seen
in the following: In monetary terms, the capital/output ratio may be
taken (and is so assumed by Arrow) to be roughly constant in this context.
Hence the capital stock and one year's production are roughly proportional.
So the capital stock can be considered as a proxy for incremental output
rather than cumulated output. And incremental output is generally not
proportional to cumulated output; if production in t and t+1 are equal,
cumulative output is higher in t+1 than in t even though capital is constant,
Formally,
t
(3) A = a Z Y
where Y = output in period t
which can be rewritten

where the right-hand side is always positive.
Now consider Arrow's function (2) from which can be written
A - A , K^ - k\
If the capital/output ratio is a constant c, as Arrow assunes it is,
then (2a) can be rewritten
This is unequal to (4), as can be seen from the fact that if Y
_
= Y
,
(4) will be positive but (5) will be zero. And (4) corresponds to the
facts that Arrow cites, including the Horndal effect, whereas (5) does
not.
Even worse are all the difficulties that flow from that most trouble-
some of all economic concepts to conceptualize and measure satisfactorily,
capital. Most fundamental here is that the capital concept used in the
model is physical, whereas the observed capital-output ratio that Arrow
builds on is a monetary notion, and there is no necessary or likely cor-
respondence between the two; more about that later.
Arrow's definition of the capital stock also is not analogous to
cumulated output in that it excludes old capital that has already
obsolesced. This is important because it means that Arrow's model does
not sum up experience since the very beginning of the learning process,
which causes a paradox in interpretation of rates of productivity
change that must be unraveled below.
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(Even cumulative output would have to be defined carefully because
of the difficulty of estimating it for an economy or society as a whole.
The entire transposition from, on the one hand, the firm or industry
level with technical measurements to, on the other hand, the national
economy with value measurements can—and in this case does—cause the
argument to lose its way, and later to be misinterpreted in empirical
work by others.)
In brief, the use of capital rather than cumulated output is one
source of erroneous interpretation of the implications of learning-by-
doing, though not the central issue here.
III. LEARNING-BY-DOING AND LABOR FORCE SIZE
This section is the piece de resistance of the paper, both because
of the necessary subtlety of the argument and because of the greater
relevance for policy of the conclusion about population size than of
conclusions about golden age growth patterns. It boils down to a dis-
tinction between equilibrium and nonequilibrlum analyses, with the latter
being appropriate for the question under discussion here.
Let us now return to the firm and industry level at which the
learning-by-doing phenomenon is actually observed, to investigate the
phenomenon's implications for various sizes of the labor force and
population.
Here we must be crystal-clear about the nature of the empirical
process on which the function is based, because a subtle shift in inter-
pretation has caused a fundamental misinterpretation. For the first unit
made, the measured number of hours spent is equal to H (the constant
a in Arrow's notation). The process is assumed to start at this point,
with K^—one of the two key values in the system
—
given exogenously

as a result of a variety of unnamed previous experiences. Successive
units require the amount of labor in the initial unit less a proportion
of that initial amount, the proportion depending on the serial number
of the successive unit. This makes clear that to portray a learning-
by-doing process one must either know, or be able to estimate from later
data, the original level of skill at which this particular process begins,
Assume that the good 1, whose cumulative quantity produced up to
period t is indexed by serial number N
,
, is a normal good. It is
reasonable to assume that the output of i in any period t is a propor-
tional function of total income
(6) N^ - Nj._^ = gY
and that total income is a proportional function of labor force size
(7) Y = hL.
where g and h are constants. The volume N - N = ghL produced in t
therefore is an increasing function of the population size. (It is
all-important here to distinguish between, on the one hand, the volume
produced in a given period t, and, on the other hand, the serial number
N, which might be produced in any period t.)
Consider the moment when a given production process N begins with
serial number N = 1. For convenience, this takes place on January 1 of
year t = 1 in country Alpha. Assume population size is P
_
,
labor
force size is !_-,, ?-'nd total national output for that year is Y
_
.
For
those conditions, there will be X units of good i produced, so at the
end of the first year the serial number is N
_
= X.
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Now assume instead that we are in countr>' Beta and population size
instead is 2P , labor force size is 2L
^^
, and consequently total
national output is 2Y . (Furthermore, the population and output have
always been twice as large in Beta as in Alpb^) . From (6) and (7) we can
g
expect that the end-of-year serial number will be N
_^
= 2X rather than
n"^ = X. Hence n"^^ - N^^ = X for L and 2X for 2L .
Now consider the rate of change of productivity A over the first
\=2 " ^t=l
period. Whatever the percentage change
, the rate will be
'^t=l
roughly twice as large for 2L , as for 1
-,
(assuming that the change
is small relative to the initial value, which one can ensure by making
the period short, say a day rather than a year)
.
To elucidate this point, let us write out the learn±ng-by-doing con-
cept in the greatest possible detail. Define the level of productivity
A as the inverse of work time per unit, and using (1)
N
=
^,-1 + ^^=1^^ - 1^ •
From (la) it is quite clear that for two firms or economies a and 2 that
produce, up to the same date, N and N > N units, the rate of
change of productivity from the beginning to that date is greater for 6
than for a,
V>N"-^?=il /v-\-=i
]
4
"i;=l
In Arrow's model we do not find that the rate of change of produc-
tivity is a function of output or labor force in anywhere near the
same way, because it is in the nature of any capital stock that it does
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not correspond in any simple additive way to all the capital produced
since the beginning of time. And this is even more true in Arrow's model
which includes obsolescence, and an arbitrary- obsolescence rule at that.
Even more important, Arrow's model invites one to write an experience
function such as
A
,
, - A aK^
,
, - aK*'
, . t+1 t t+1 t
'»>
—7; ^7—
where the dates include any given period. Though Arrow does not write
this function explicitly, he likens his model to Kaldor's, who writes
the similar function
^t \ \-l j
In Arrow's words, "The production assumptions of this section are designed
to play the role assigned by Kaldor to his 'technical progress function,'
which relates the rate of growth of output per worker to the rate of
growth of capital per worker. I prefer to think of relations between
rates of growth as themselves derived from more fundamental relations
between the magnitudes involved" (p. 160), He also says that "Verdoorn
had also developed a similar simple model" (p. 160); Verdoorn differs
in using output per year, but his independent variable is also a rate
of change of the current magnitude. So there is little doubt that
function (8) is a fair representation of Arrow's model. And in his
empirical "Tests of the 'Learning By Doing' Hypothesis," Sheshinski (1967)
estimated exactly this model where "the increase in experience ... is
attributed to current gross investment" (that is, the rate of change of
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productivity = investment v capital stock),* or in an alternative
model, "the change in experience is attributed to the rate of output"
(that is, the rate of change of productivity = output -r "cumulated
gross output," where Sheshinki's empirical referent of the latter con-
cept is unclear but is certainly not cumulated gross output since the
beginning of the process, as required for a reasonable portrayal of the
leaming-by-doing process) .
Given that a country's situation at any given date is compared
to its own situation at some slightly earlier date, the rate of change
of the capital stock may be expected to be the same for larger country
Beta as for smaller country Alpha, ceteris paribus. Hence in Arrow's
model the rate of increase of productivity is essentially independent of
the scale of the economy and of the population, though it will reflect
short-run changes in output (through differences in investment and the
capital stock). That is, though this model may lend itself to estimating
the rate for a given process, it does not enable one to compare the re-
sults for two entities of different sizes.
To make the point as graphic as possible: If fathers cut their
male offspring's hair monthly, a father with twin sons will get twice
as much practice in any period, and his skill at any date will be higher,
than that of a father with only one son (assuming equal beginning skill)
.
This does not imply that in each period the twins' father's rate of
increase of skill will be higher than that of the father of only one son;
"Actually, Sheshinski estimated Kaldor's model in which the r.h.s. is
,'K - K '\
' t t-1^.
cl-
K^
,
' rather than Arrow's model in which the right hand
' Ft - ^t-i
would be ;
learning-by-doing mod'el
.
'\
, /K - K
_
,
side 1, though he said that he was testing the
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if the learning curve has the same exponent at all points, the rates
will be the same in each period after the first. Nor need the absolute
increase in skill be greater in any period for the twins' father than
for the single-son's father. But the rate of increase of productivity
from the beginning to any given date will be greater for the father with
twins than for the father with one son.*
There is an apparent paradox here: If two countries of different
sizes of population and output are compared for a period starting after
a process has begun, at the same date in both, the rates of change of
productivity over the period can be the same, even though if the period
begins at the beginning of the process, the rate of change of productivity
of the larger country will be greater. For example, assume that Alpha pro-
duces one unit per period, and Beta produces two units per period. Be-
tween periods four and five. Alpha goes from serial 4 to serial 5,
whereas Beta goes from 8 to 10. If A_.— the level of technology' of the
first unit, the inverse of the numbers of hours required to make the
first unit— is equal to 10, if b = .5, and hence if A^ = ION* , then for
Alpha
^t=5 ~ '^t=4 ^=5 " S}=4 lO/T - lO/T
^t=4 'Sl=4 10V4'
and also for Beta
'^t=5 " '^t=4 •St=10 " "^=8 10/TO - lOvS"
.414
A
t=4 ^=8 lO.'B
.414,
*If one worries about the inequality in total employment of the two
fathers, the example could be changed to a society with one father-
barber versus a society with two father-barbers, all with one child
each. In the economy with two fathers, they exchange information on
what they learn, and hence increase the rate of their learning; this
is quite realistic.
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But from the beginning of the process to the end of period 5,
the calculations are for Alpha
"^t^S ~ '"^t^l ^ IQr^ - lO/T
'^t=l lOvT
and for Beta
'^t=5 " ^=1 ^ lO/lQ - lO/T .
\]=i 10 vT
So Beta's rate of increase of productivity is faster than Alpha's
when calculated from the beginning of the process.
We can see the economic importance of this population effect with
a simple simulation model, comparing the results for more-developed
technology-producing worlds of two sizes, one twice as large as the
other. Such a simple model has a Cobb-Douglas production function, a
savings function proportional to output (set at the much-lower-than-
steady-state value to avoid difficult arguments), and a one percent
labor-force growth rate per year.
The model is as follows:
Y = A L^K^
t t t t
^ = ^t-1 ^ ' \-V ' = -"^
Initial values A = 1.0, L = 1000, K = 1000, Y = 500, a = .67, g = .33.
t t t t
' '
An iterative program is used to make investment approximately a function
of current-period income rather than prior-period income, so that the
computer model would approximate the steady-state analytic model; the
results are nnjch the same with and without this refinement, however.
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The technological-change function, for both populations, is
t-1
,
M = m( Z Y ) b = .2 or .3
C Q t-1
The learning parameter in the model is initially set to produce 1%
productivity change per year in the smaller population. And the model
for both populations starts with the same cumulated amount of output
obtained by jobbing back from the initial year's value, which is unre-
alistically advantageous to the smaller population; the result is not
sensitive to differences in this initial condition, however.
The relevant comparison in a long-run context would seem to be one
in which capital per head has achieved the same level in both the worlds.
From this assumption it is obvious that the bigger world must have
faster growth, because there is no offset to the productivity effect
through capital dilution in this set-up (though later we shall see,
in the context of different rates of growth , how the tradeoff between
capital dilution and productivity effects plays itself out).
The relevant measure of performance in a policy context is a com-
parison of present values of future income streams under the different
population assumptions. Table 1 shows the present values for the two
initial populations at various rates of discount. Clearly the outlook
for the future standard of living is better with the larger initial
population. Of course the differences would be less with a lower
learning parameter, and greater with a higher learning parameter.
Table 1
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It is clear, then, that a larger population, market, and total out-
put imply faster economic growth due to learning-by-doing. But there
is no chance that this phenomenon will be observed if the Kaldor-Arrow
model is used, either theoretically as in Arrow's and Kaldor's work, or
empirically, as in Sheshinski's work.
Furthermore, this effect implies that the rate of growth of produc-
tivity will increase with time, rather than being steady-state growth
as Arrow concluded that it is. To show that this is so, we must return
our thinking to the company and industry level at which the learning-
by-doing phenomenon actually observed, rather than moving directly to
the macro level by simple analogy to the firm.
Once a learning-by-doing process begins, the rate of learning may
be constant with increasing production volume.* But another process that
is identical in all economic details with the one previously under dis-
cussion, except that it comes along later, will operate in an environment
of a bigger total market and total output (due in part to the earlier
innovation) even if population size remains constant. Therefore sales
will be greater if the good is a normal one, and the rate of learning
per unit of time will be faster for the later innovation than for the
earlier one. To the extent that these innovations are representative
of the economy as a whole, then, the rate of increase of productivity
for the economy as a whole will increase over time.
*0r it may decline with output (e.g., Barkai and Levhari, 1973; Levhari
and Sheshinski, 1973; Baloff, 1966, and references cited therein).
Though the rate of learning in a given product situation may decrease,
there may still be changes in the processes which restart a high-rate
learning process, and increase the overall rate of learning.
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An increasing rate of growth of productivity implies that there is
not a constant capital-output ratio, as may be deduced immediately from
the well-known
(10) s = -(n + A)
.
where s = savings ratio
V = output-capital ratio
n = population growth rate
A = rate of change of A.
But this is in no way inconsistent with observed reality nor is it a
ground for concern, despite the supposed "stylized fact" of an observed
constant K/Y ratio, because the monetary estimates of the capital-output
ratio tell nothing about the physical capital-output ratio, as I show
elsewhere (Simon, 1980). The observed constant K/Y ratio in value terms
is simply an inevitable price response of competitive markets, and has
no significance for long-run production relationships.* The relevant K/Y
ratio— the physical ratio
—
probably is not constant in MDC's but rather
secularly falling, though this proposition cannot ever be examined rigor-
ously in its aggregate form.
One might wonder why larger economies do not grow faster than smaller
economies, in light of the above analysis. In fact, Chenery and associates
*It is still another problem with Arrow's model that despite its real-
resource nature, he bases it upon the assumption of a constant K/Y ratio,
despite the meaninglessness of the monetary K/Y ratio to describe the
physical K/Y ratio in the long-run and the fact that the physical K/Y
ratio is falling in the long run.
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(e.g., Chenery and Syrquin, 1975) do_ observe econoniies of size in cross-
national comparisons of growth rates in IDC's. And the Rostas-Clark data
show a strong effect in individual industries (Clark, 1967). But, addi-
tionally, to the extent that economies are open, there are forces that
reduce the observed differences in growth among countries. Specializa-
tion (e.g., Sweden in autos, Holland in communications) can lead to
larger markets than the national economy provides. And a considerable
proportion of technical progress is not locally tied and moved across
national boundaries. Hence there is no inconsistency between the ob-
served data and the analysis given here. The relevant conceptual unit
for analysis of the sort given above is the Western industrialized world
as a whole, with the relevant comparison being between imagined larger
and smaller sizes of it.
IV. LEARNING-BY-DOING AND LABOR FORCE GROWTH
It is reasonably easy to show that in a comparison of two populations
with different rates of labor-force growth (with optimum savings ratios)
that are already on a steady growth path, faster labor-force growth implies
higher consumption—as long as technical progress is an increasing func-
tion of the size of the labor of on total output, even to the slightest
degree . Consider a situation in which technical progress does not de-
pend upon either labor force or total output; if so, technical progress
will be the same, and the rate of growth of per-capita output will also
be the same , for every rate of population (labor force) growth, though
consumption will be lower with higher population growth due to the higher
warranted savings rate. But if technical progress _is faster with a higher
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population growth rate—as it is with function C6a) because faster popu-
lation growth implies faster increase in aggregate income and hence in
capital—then the rate of growth of per capita output must be faster
with higher population growth. And this must therefore eventually (no
matter how slight the dependence of technical progress on population
or output) lead to higher levels of per capita output and consumption.
This is the argument in a nutshell.*
Arrow's model does show increasing returns to scale. But
Arrow does not describe the effect of a change in only L or L. Further-
more, his returns to scale derive from an unusual sort of production
function—one with fixed coefficients rather than a neo-classical form
—
which would not be appropriate for analysis of the effect of a change in
L or L. And Kaldor, using the same sort of technical progress function
but a different sort of growth model, concludes that an increase in L
depresses the rate of growth of output, or at best leaves it unchanged
(pp. 615-616). >iore generally, as Eltis puts it, "Both Kaldor and Arrow
wrote long and forceful passages to argue that there is likely to be a
strong endogenous relationship between investment and technical progress
in the real world. Unfortunately, their subsequent mathematical speci-
fication of the relationship precluded any endogenous connection in
equilibrium— in their growth models" (1973, p. 154). And this is even
*The comparison of steady growth paths is not the relevant comparison
for a given society's policy choice at a given moment, however. Rather,
the society wishes to evaluate its future streams of costs and benefits
with different rates of population growth, given its present endowment
of capital and level of income. That comparison is the subject of
ariDther paper.
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more true of Che connection between the rate of growth of the labor
force and the rate of growth of consumption.
In short, Learning-by-doing implies that the steady-state consump-
tion path inevitably comes to be higher with faster population growth
than with slower population growth, in contrast to standard growth theory's
conclusions.
Phelps' model (1966), too, implies that faster labor-force growth pro-
duces a higher golden-age consumption path. And Eltis (1973) arrived at
this conclusion explicitly. My C/m model (1977, Chapter 6), which has a
technical progress function closer to a learning-by-doing formulation
than that of Phelps or Eltis, also produced a conclusion that higher pop-
ulation growth implies higher consumption after an initial period during
which capital-dilution produces lower consumption. And a straightforward
neo-classical model with Arrow's own formulation of learning-by-doing also
produces this result under most assumptions.
Though it is outside the main purpose of this paper, the simulation
described earlier was also run with different rates of growth of the labor
force, all other initial conditions identical. In the earlier years, the
lower rate of population growth (1% yearly) leads to higher per-worker
consumption because of the capital dilution effect than does 2% population
growth. But after tim or three decades (just how long depends on the
assumptions) the higher rate of population growth comes to have higher
per-worker consumption due to its faster rate of productivity growth.
And a present-value computation shows that the higher rate of population
growth yields better results up to very significant discount rates, and
at all discount rates where thereare meaningful differences between the
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various population-growth assumptions. These results may be seen in
Table 1.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Arrow's (and Kaldor's) representation of learning-by-doing and the
current state of technique as a function of capital rather than of cumu-
lated output— the latter being the empirical basis for the learning-by-
doing concept—leads to major confusion. An obvious though not-very-
important example is that a constant production level implies no progress
in such a formulation, though there is solid evidence that learning-by-
doing continues as cumulated output increases.
An important implication of the learning-by-doing phenomenon (as
with almost any model where technical progress is endogenous) is that
it leads to a different conclusion about population growth than does
standard growth theory, implying that the eventual consumption path is
higher with faster population growth. Arrow's model does not show this
clearly, Kaldor somehow reached the opposite conclusion, and standard
growth-theoretic texts (e.g., Solow, 1970; Wan, 1971; Brems, 1973; Dixit,
1975)— even the specialized summary of growth theory with respect to
population growth of Pitchford (1974)—do not mention this implication.
The most important implication of learnlng-by-doing for population
policy—with respect to immigration as well as natural increase— is that
a population of larger size implies faster growth of consumption per
head than does a smaller population size. Arrow's formulation does not
reveal this implication, and empirical work built on Arrow's model does
not reach this conclusion. The paper unravels an apparent paradox and
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shows that a corrected formulation of the learning-by-doing inodel does
indeed have this important implication, which is consistent with rele-
vant empirical data of several kinds.
M/D/:42
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Table 1
Present Values (600 Years) of Per-Capita Consumption Streams
With Two Different Initial Population Sizes
And Various Rates of Savings and Population Growth
b = .5
L = 1000 L = 2000
K = 1000 K = 2000
L K
0% 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
.653 .732 .315 .1497 a42 .111 .869 .897 .366 .221 .156 .120
E+3 E+2 E+2 E+2 E+2 E+2 E+3 E+2 E+2 E+2 E+2 E+2
4 ,190 .120 .403 .228 .157 .119 .495 .215 .566 .288 .187 .137
E+4 E+3 E+2 E+2 E+2 E+2 E+4 E+3 E+2 E+2 E+2 E+2
1 2 .103 .179 .383 .211 .146 .112 .198 .295 .498 .250 .166 .124
E+5 E+3 E+2 E+2 E+2 E+2 E+5 E+3 E+2 E+2 E+2 E+2
1 4 .191 .282 .470 .236 .858 .118 .372 .489 .644 .290 .183 .133
E+5 E+3 E+2 E+2 E+2 E+2 E+5 E+3 E+2 E+2 E+2 E+2
1 a .353 .405 .616 .278 .176 .128 .692 .838 .897 .356 .211 .147
E+5 E+3 E+2 E+2 E+2 E+2 E+5 E+3 E+2 E+2 E+2 E+2
2 4 .913 .448 .879 .249 .155 .115 .182 .888 .148 .326 .185 .131
E+6 E+4 E+2 E+2 E+2 E+2 E+7 E+4 E+3 E+2 E+2 E+2
2 3 .173 .842 .141 .313 .178 .126 .346 .167 .249 .436 .221 .148
E+7 E+4 E+3 E+2 E+2 E+2 E+7 E+5 E+3 E+2 E+2 E+2
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